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Abstract
Based on a dynamic open-economy macroeconomic model, this paper aims at un-
derstanding the contribution of domestic financial under-development to foreign
reserve accumulation in some emerging market economies, especially in China. It
is argued that foreign reserve accumulation is a consequence of a growth strategy
induced by strong capital investment in a financially constrained economy. It is
further proved using a Ramsey problem that purchasing international reserves is a
welfare-improving policy in terms of production efficiency gains when the domes-
tic economy faces two sources of frictions: credit constraint and capital controls.
In fact, when domestic firms are occasionally credit-constrained and they do not
have a direct access to international financial market, they need domestic saving
instruments to increase their retained earnings so that they can sufficiently invest in
capital. The central bank/government plays the role of financial intermediary and
provides domestic firms with a liquid public bond, thus relaxing the domestic credit
constraint. The proceeds of domestic public bonds are then invested abroad due
to the limited scope of domestic financial market and a depressed domestic interest
rate, leading to foreign reserve stockpiling. The speed of foreign reserve accumula-
tion will slow down with the domestic financial deepening and the development of
the domestic financial market.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Research background
Over the last decade, we observe a surge in foreign reserve accumulation throughout
the world and in particular in emerging market economies. The latter became the main
reserve holders, taking over the place of advanced countries around 2005. As Figure
1 shows, the share of foreign reserves held by emerging and developing economies has
doubled in eight years since 2000, rising from 33% to 67% of total foreign reserves in the
world.
Figure 1: Evolution of the world reserves
Facing this trend of rapid accumulation of foreign reserves in the last decade, a renewed
literature revived the debate regarding the determinants of the demand for foreign assets
and the reserve adequacy ratio. Since very recently, there seems to be a consensus deeming
that the motives of holding foreign reserves can be time-varying and specific to individual
countries or country groups. An empirical paper by Ghosh et al. (2012) and a report of
the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
confirmed this broad view.
Evidence has shown that countries accumulate reserves for many reasons that
cannot be captured in single indicators or models, and sources of vulnerability
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evolve over time. Reserve adequacy assessments and advice therefore need to
rely on a broad range of indicators which should be adjusted when circum-
stances change (IEO (2012)).
In this paper, I propose a general equilibrium model to analyze a particular factor, the
under-development of the domestic financial market, which may motivate a central bank
to purchase foreign assets. Despite the extensive academic and policy debates with regard
to international reserves, a theoretical model on the relationship between financial market
under-development and reserve accumulation remains elusive. My analysis is based on
three facts that we observe in the data.
Fact 1 Emerging market economies which have accumulated a large stock of foreign
assets are those which have experienced a fast economic growth.
Figure 2 shows a clear positive relationship between the average growth rate of real
GDP per capita and that of foreign reserve stocks between 1980 and 2010 for 24 emerging
economies.
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Figure 2: Foreign reserve accumulation vs. real GDP growth Data source: the World Bank
WDI database for the real GDP series and the IMF IFS database for the foreign reserves series (Total
Reserves Minus Gold, line 1 l.)
Indeed, most foreign reserve holders are middle income countries 1 (upper and lower
middle income countries all combined according the the World Bank’s classification). We
114 out of the 20 biggest countries in terms of the foreign reserves to GDP ratio (average between
2000 to 2008) are middle income countries.
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can think that they are in the phase of fast economic catch-up. The positive relationship
between real economic growth rate and demand for foreign reserves suggests that holding
reserves may be part of economic catch-up strategies.
Fact 2 Among the middle income countries which have accumulated foreign reserves
in the past decades, many have a relatively under-developed domestic private financial
market.
In some developing and emerging economies, bank loans constitute the major source
of corporate financing, as the scope of the domestic equity and bond market is limited and
domestic financial assets are thus scarce. Therefore, some domestic firms have to rely on
retained earnings to finance their production activities. Figure 3 illustrates the public and
private bond to GDP ratios compared with the foreign reserves to GDP ratio in selected
countries. It seems like the lower the supply of domestic private bond and the higher the
supply of domestic public bond, the more important is the level of foreign reserves. One
natural conjecture about this is that the public bond constitutes an important source of
domestic financing when the private market is very constrained. With a limited scope of
the domestic financial market, public bond proceeds are highly likely invested abroad in
the form of foreign reserves.
Fact 3 In some reserve holding countries, we observe a persistent - and sometimes
increasingly large - gap between gross domestic savings and gross domestic loans.
The gap between gross domestic savings and gross domestic loans signals some degrees
of credit frictions in these countries. The credit borrowing channel being constrained, the
need to save cannot be satisfied without the intervention of the public sector. We illustrate
this point using Chinese data (see Figure 4). As long as the wedge between domestic
savings and loans exists, the domestic financial market is repressed and the domestic real
interest rate is lower than the world interest rate. From here, we ponder whether there
exist some domestic structural deficiencies which caused domestic excess savings, leading
to a current account surplus and foreign reserve stockpiling.
Based on these three stylized facts, I shall make two points in this paper: 1) Financial
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Figure 3: Domestic bond market vs. foreign reserves in selected countries
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repression is Pareto sub-optimal for fast-growing emerging market economies with credit
constraints. As some domestic firms heavily rely on retained earnings for financing their
production, a repressed domestic interest rate would dampen firms’ retained earnings. 2)
Purchasing foreign reserve assets constitutes a second-best growth strategy in an economy
where the domestic financial market is under-developed (both for the lack of domestic
financial assets and for the existence of credit constraints) on the one hand and where
there are controls on capital flows.
It is worthwhile emphasizing the importance of capital controls to trigger foreign
reserve holding. In fact, capital controls constitute a way to discriminate public and
private capital flows, so that public capital outflows (i.e. purchasing foreign assets)
would not be entirely offset by private capital inflows (i.e. private external borrowing).
This imperfect substitutability can also appear by setting an ad-hoc external borrowing
constraint of domestic firms based on the asymmetric information facing international
investors (such as in Benigno and Fornaro (2012)). With this regard, China constitutes
an interesting illustration for my analysis, as in this country both financial market frictions
and capital controls are present. Therefore, in the subsequent sections, I will mainly focus
on the example of China.
Figure 4: Foreign reserves and gap between savings and loans in China
In the scope of this paper, I rule out the aspect of international trade and exchange
rate policies. This choice is explained by the need to focus on the relationship between
domestic financial market under-development and foreign reserve holding. Moreover,
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there is no consensus in academia on the (reverse) causality between foreign reserve
holding and exchange rate stability. We do not know whether keeping the domestic
currency undervalued is the objective of foreign reserve accumulation or both of them are
side effects of some other macroeconomic consideration.
1.2 A growth story of foreign reserve accumulation
Through which channel do foreign reserves affect economic growth? I argue that
the effect of foreign reserve accumulation goes through the fixed capital formation and
production efficiency gains.
Many academic works show that domestic capital accumulation remains the main
driver of economic catch-up in emerging economies - especially in East Asia - as the neo-
classical growth theory predicts. Based on this viewpoint, even the Chinese spectacular
growth rate is not a ‘miracle’; the contribution of fixed capital formation looms large (Yu
(1998), Nelson and Pack (1999), Song et al. (2011)).
Figure 5 shows a clear positive relationship between foreign reserves to GDP ratio
and gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio in China from 1980 to 2010. Figure 6
illustrates that the year-on-year growth rate of foreign reserves and that of gross fixed
capital formation coincide very closely since the mid-1990s in China. If we further test the
Granger causality of these two variables, we find that the growth rate of foreign reserves
leads that of gross fixed capital formation.
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Figure 6: Annual growth rate of foreign reserves and of GFCF
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As illustrated in Figure 7, the story I tell in this paper is as follows: in a financial-
ly constrained economy, entrepreneurs need to make precautionary savings when they
harvest an output in order to overcome the credit constraint when they face investment
opportunities. In an fully open economy, this leads to a gap between domestic savings
and investment, thus current account surplus. However, if in addition there were capital
controls, entrepreneurs would not have direct access to international financial market in
order to make precautionary savings. In this case, the central bank can play the role
of financial intermediary and provide a domestic liquid bond with which domestic en-
trepreneurs can save. By issuing domestic liquid bonds, the central bank alleviates the
credit constraint facing investing entrepreneurs because firms can save more with the pub-
lic bond (volume increases) and domestic interest rate is less repressed (price increases).
As the domestic financial market is limited in its scope, the central bank can only invest
its bond proceeds abroad, in the form of foreign reserve assets. A further motivation for
the central bank to invest the bond proceeds abroad is that the world interest rate is
higher than the domestic interest rate as long as the domestic financial market is con-
strained and the domestic interest rate depressed. With the provision of domestic liquid
bonds, entrepreneurs will have higher retained earnings with which they can invest more
in capital regardless to the institutional credit constraint. Interestingly, capital plays a
dual role in this economy: it is not only the input for production, it is the collateral
for credit borrowing as well. With higher capital accumulation, the credit constraint is
further relaxed, all pushing the economy to achieve the first best level. There is indeed a
‘financial accelerator’ effect in the model.
As we can see in subsequent sections, foreign reserve accumulation constitutes a
second-best strategy during economic transition in the presence of credit and capital
account constraints. With this regard, the level of foreign reserves will increase until
the capital deepening is strong enough and/or the domestic private financial market is
sufficiently developed.
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Figure 7: Storyline
1.3 Review of the literature
This paper is related to two broad strands of literature: the motives of foreign reserve
accumulation, especially from a domestic structural viewpoint on the one hand and the
economic growth in the presence of credit constraints on the other hand.
A country may accumulate foreign reserves for reasons of different nature: to consti-
tute a buffer stock for the sake of crisis prevention or/and crisis management (precau-
tionary approach2,Bianchi et al. (2012)), to intervene in the foreign exchange market for
the defense of a fixed exchange rate or for preventing the domestic currency from appre-
ciation (mercantilist approach3), or to hold foreign reserves due to domestic structural
deficiencies (structural approach). My work is related in particular to the last approach.
According to this strand of literature, countries accumulate foreign assets as a
natural consequence of the wedge between domestic savings and investment. As
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) put it, ’the allocation puzzle is a saving puzzle.’ Accord-
ing to this paper, the distortions in the domestic financial sector may induce domestic
precautionary savings. The distortions can be understood either in terms of the capac-
ity of a country to supply safe assets (Caballero et al. (2008)) or in terms of the credit
constraint facing domestic firms. In the presence domestic credit constraint, the econo-
my in its whole needs to make precautionary savings, generating a positive gap between
domestic savings and investment, source of capital outflows. Bacchetta and Benhima
2See Aizenman and Lee (2007),Aizenman and Hutchison (2010), Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011),
Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
3See Dooley et al. (2003), Korinek and Serven (2010), Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
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(2010), Wen (2011) and Song et al. (2011) are the most relevant references with this
regard. Based on an open economy with a credit constraint facing firms which invest,
Bacchetta and Benhima (2010) show that the demand for foreign bonds is a complement
to domestic investment rather than a substitute. The reason behind is that foreign bonds
constitute supplementary corporate saving assets for credit-constrained firms. The re-
tained earnings can be used to invest in capital even if firms’ borrowing capacity can be
constrained. Therefore, in a fast growing economy, the demand for foreign bonds increas-
es with domestic capital formation. In the same vein, Song et al. (2011) shed light on
how a constrained access to bank loans of private firms compared to state-owned firms
can lead to a large level of corporate precautionary savings, thus to a persistent current
account surplus. As there is a gradual transformation of state-owned firms into private
ones, the overall precautionary savings increase, so do foreign reserves. Finally, Wen
(2011) tries to ‘make sense of China’s excessive foreign reserves’ by looking at household
savings. He argues that a large uninsured risk (e.g. the lack of a sound social safety net),
severe borrowing constraints, and rapid income growth can create an excessive level of
high household saving rates and large current account surpluses for emerging economies.
Therefore, foreign reserve accumulation is a natural consequence of a country’s fast e-
conomic catch-up with an inefficient financial system. As all the three papers look at
the demand for foreign assets in a small open economy setting with no capital controls,
the government/central bank is absent. The public and private capital flows are thus
perfect substitutes. What they examine is rather the change in a country’s net foreign
assets rather than the central bank’s foreign reserves per se. My current work differs from
theirs by targeting to the central bank’s reserve assets. Moreover, foreign reserves are
only a residual of private precautionary savings in these models while in my paper I argue
that the social planner may have an optimal policy to boost domestic capital investment
through purchasing foreign reserves.
In parallel, there is a strand of literature examining how policies of the governmen-
t/central bank help alleviate domestic credit constraint. A seminal paper by Woodford
(1990) demonstrates the welfare-improving effects of public debts in promoting domestic
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capital investment in the presence of credit constraints. This paper is based on a financial
autarky setting.
One contribution of my current work is to combine the above-mentioned two approach-
es and the features of both a small open economy and a closed economy setting. To put it
in a different way, I examine the relationship between the demand for foreign assets and
domestic capital formation in an economy with capital controls; only the public sector,
e.g. the central bank, has a full access to international financial market. Private firms are
forbidden to borrow/lend abroad directly. The imperfect substitutability thus requires
the introduction of a central bank in the model. The model I present below will allow
us to examine whether accumulating foreign reserves constitutes an optimal policy for
the central bank. This paper is however not the first one which introduces a social plan-
ner (e.g. government or central bank) to discriminate public and private capital flows.
Bacchetta et al. (2012) and Benigno and Fornaro (2012) also examine the foreign reserve
accumulation in the presence of capital controls (Bacchetta et al. (2012)) or when private
flows are not perfectly substitutable to public flows based on their respective credibility
(Benigno and Fornaro (2012)).
My paper differs from Bacchetta et al. (2012) as I choose to use a production model
so that I can focus on the contribution of reserves to domestic capital formation, driv-
er of economic catch-up in emerging market economies. The introduction of capital is
very important for two reasons. First, by introducing domestic capital formation, I add
production efficiency gains when examining the optimal policy of foreign reserve accumu-
lation in the presence of credit constraint and capital controls, in addition to redistributive
effects and consumption smoothing gains. According to the literature of growth theory,
the gains from production efficiency have a much more persistent and stronger impact on
growth than that from pure consumption smoothing. This is thus a major contribution of
my paper compared to Bacchetta et al. (2012) who only focus on consumption smooth-
ing gains. Secondly, the introduction of capital formation makes my model setting more
relevant for countries with large stock of foreign reserves, such as China, as in my model,
households are allowed to finance directly firms through their savings.
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My paper differs from Benigno and Fornaro (2012) as I model in a different manner
the imperfect substitutability between public and private capital flows on the one hand
and I consider a different motive of foreign reserve accumulation from their paper. While
Benigno and Fornaro (2012) study the precautionary and mercantilist motives of foreign
reserve accumulation, I focus on the imperfection of domestic financial market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setting. Section
3 analyzes the reserve accumulation and capital formation in a decentralized economy.
Section 4 introduces the optimal policy of the central bank. Section 5 presents a numerical
analysis. Section 6 presents some policy implications and concludes.
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2 Model setting
Using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, the baseline model
economy is a small economy with a single consumption good. There are three types of
agents in the economy. Two symmetric entrepreneurs, a ‘hand-to-month’ labor and an
active central bank. We describe their behaviors as follows.
2.1 Entrepreneurs and their optimal behavior
Two symmetric infinitely lived entrepreneurs produce and consume in this economy
and they are occasionally constrained for credit borrowing every two periods when they
face productive investment opportunities. In fact, each entrepreneur changes status every
two periods, alternating between a ‘saving period (denoted S )’ and an ‘investing period
(denoted I )’, according to the following Markov chain.

 It+1
St+1

 = M

 St
It

 =

 0 1
1 0



 St
It


Entrepreneurs’ budget constraints
A typical entrepreneur in his saving period receives the output from production (cap-
ital is chosen a period ahead) but does not have immediate productive investment plan
available and thus chooses to save part of the revenue for future investment. On the other
hand, in the investing period, an entrepreneur has immediate productive plans but does
not have sufficient funding to invest, therefore it needs to borrow to invest in physical
capital stock.
A typical entrepreneur who starts at time t with a saving period will have the following
budget constraints every two periods.
At t :Πt − rtLt = c
S
t + St+1 (1)
At t+1 :rt+1St+1 + Lt+2 = c
I
t+1 +Kt+2 (2)
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That is, the saving entrepreneur uses his disposable income Πt to reimburse loans
subscribed a period ahead rtLt. It consumes c
S
t and makes savings St+1 (in the form of
lending to the investing entrepreneur or of central bank bonds). In the next period, there
is a productive plan available, a saving entrepreneur becomes an investing entrepreneur
and uses his retained earnings to consume cIt and to invest in capital stock Kt+2. rt is the
domestic gross interest rate (rt > 1, for all t). As the revenue during investing stage is
limited (no output available), the investing entrepreneur needs to make a loan Lt+2 from
the other entrepreneur who is in his saving period (due to symmetry).
The other symmetric entrepreneur who starts at time t with an investing period will
have two reversed budget constraints as compared with above.
At t :rtSt + Lt+1 = c
I
t +Kt+1
At t+1 :Πt+1 − rt+1Lt+1 = c
S
t+1 + St+2
Πt denotes the wealth of the entrepreneur at the beginning of his saving period t. It
comprises the production that the entrepreneur harvests using the capital stock invested
a period ahead and the labor hired at the current period, net of labor cost.
Πt = F (At, Kt, Nt)− wtNt (3)
At, Kt, Nt and wt denote respectively the labor-enhanced productivity, capital stock,
labor force and per capita wage.
The production function F (Kt, At, Nt) is a standard neoclassical production function:
increasing in all arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one. We use FK,t and
FN,t to denote the marginal product of capital and of labor respectively.
Moreover, we introduce a passive fiscal policy (out of the hands of the central bank)
in the model by allowing distortionary taxes on capital and labor. Denote τK,t and τN,t
marginal rate of tax on capital and labor. Then we can express the after-tax marginal
product of capital and labor, F˜K,t and F˜N,t as follows:
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F˜K,t = FK,t − τK,t (4)
F˜N,t = FN,t − τN,t (5)
Therefore, based on the chapter 15 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), we can rewrite
the production function before and after tax payment in terms of the inputs and their
(after-tax) marginal products:
F (At, Kt, Nt) = FK,tKt + FN,tNt (6)
F˜ (At, Kt, Nt) = F˜K,tKt + F˜N,tNt (7)
The advantage of doing so, as underlined by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), is that
we can treat F˜K,t as a new variable independent from FK,t, similarly for F˜N,t and FN,t.
Entrepreneurs’ program
Entrepreneurs maximize the intertemporal utility function:
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
U(cSt ) + βU(c
I
t+1)
)
(8)
As the two entrepreneurs are perfectly symmetric, we only need to look at the program
of the entrepreneur who starts with a saving period at time t.
Notice that one of the market failure of the model economy is that there is a credit
constraint facing the entrepreneur in his investing stage. This constraint is motivated
by the classic argument of the asymmetric information. Namely, as the lender (the
entrepreneur in his saving period) cannot guarantee the repayment of his debtor, he
requires a collateral when making loans.
This credit constraint in some emerging market economies are institutional in nature.
For example, in China, domestic private companies have a very restrictive access to bank
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loans because of their status. The biggest Chinese banks are state-owned and prefer to
lend money to state-owned firms, as Song et al. (2011) details.
Following this argument, we model the credit constraint as below:
Lt+2 ≤
ψΠt+2
rt+2
(9)
The maximum loan that an investing entrepreneur can get is conditional on the dis-
counted value of the disposable income that the entrepreneur will obtain next period
when he harvest an output. ψ denotes the tightness of credit constraint, ψ ∈ [0, 1]. The
smaller is ψ, the tighter the constraint is.
To obtain the optimal behavior of an entrepreneur in a decentralized economy, we
maximize the equation (8) subject to (1), (2) and (9). And we obtain the following first
order conditions. Note that λt+2u
′(cSt+2) denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the credit constraint at time t + 2.
(1 + ψλt)F˜K,t = rt(1 + λt) (10)
F˜N,t = wt (11)
u′(cSt ) = βrt+1u
′(cIt+1) (12)
u′(cIt+1) = βrt+2u
′(cSt+2)(1 + λt+2) (13)
Equation (10) tells us that the after-tax marginal product of capital is equal to the cost
of capital rt augmented by a coefficient
1+λt
1+ψλt
, which is related to the credit constraint.
Equation (11) equalizes the after-tax marginal product of labor with unit wage. Equations
(12) and (13) are Euler equations. The Euler equation (13) which relates the marginal
utility of the consumption of an entrepreneur in investing state to that of the same
entrepreneur in saving stage depends clearly on the tightness of the credit constraint.
According to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to
the credit constraint verifies:
16
λt+2u
′(cSt+2)(rt+2Lt+2 − ψΠt+2) = 0
Therefore, the credit constraint may be binding (rt+2Lt+2 = ψΠt+2) or non binding
(λt+2 = 0).
Notice that, when the credit constraint is binding, the investing entrepreneur at each
period cannot borrow as much as they would like to do, therefore they cannot absorb all
the funding the saving entrepreneur is willing to provide. This leads to a gap between
saving and loans in each period. The central bank can thus play a role in order to close
this gap. The strategy of the central bank is described later on.
2.2 Labor market
For simplicity, we assume that the labor supply is perfectly inelastic, namely N supplyt =
1.
On the demand side, from the first order condition (11), we know that the marginal
product of labor, F˜N,t, which is equal to wage w, is decreasing in labor demand N
demand
t .
Therefore, we obtain a conventional decreasing labor demand function.
For a given level of technology At and capital stock Kt, the labor demand and supply
functions uniquely pin down the wage and the equilibrium labor on the labor market.
Therefore, we are allowed to use this result from the labor market equilibrium
N supplyt = N
demand
t = 1 henceforth.
Using this result and equation (11), we can rewrite the after-tax operational income
of family companies:
Πt = F˜K,tKt + F˜L,tNt − wtNt (14)
= F˜K,tKt (15)
Note that as the labor is inelastic in the model, the marginal tax on labor does not
have distortionary effect. Any change in the marginal tax rate of labor is equivalent to a
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lump-sum tax (transfer) to the labor force which is out of our scrutiny.
2.3 The central bank’s Behavior
The hallmark of this paper is that we explicitly model the behavior of the central bank
in the model economy. We argue that the central bank can provide a liquid central bank
bond, which is used as a supplementary saving instrument for the saving entrepreneur.
As we will show later on, this may be a second-best strategy of the central bank when
the domestic financial market is under-developed.
General setting
Several characteristics about the central bank in our model needs to be underlined.
First of all, the central bank is a consortium of the monetary authority and the commercial
banks. This setting is plausible as in China the banking system is mainly state-owned.
In fact, according to Walter and Howie (2012), more than 90 percent of total commercial
banking assets is state-controlled in China.
Secondly, the central bank is the only player which has access to international financial
market in our model economy. This situation is dubbed by Bacchetta et al. (2012) as
a ‘semi-open’ economy. This way of modeling corresponds to what we observe about
China’s capital account management. In fact, China not only accumulates foreign reserves
but also closely control capital inflows and outflows. The private sector does not have
a full access to the international financial market. Within the scope of the paper, we
assume that the capital controls which make domestic private capital flows and public
capital flows imperfectly substitutable are institutional in nature and cannot be removed
in the short-run. To our understanding, the need of setting capital controls are closely
related to the under-development of the domestic financial market which is the focus of
our analysis.
Thirdly, the central bank does not control fiscal policy which is in the hands of the
government. As the State is the ultimate shareholder of the central bank, we argue
that distortionary taxes on capital and labor are used to balance the central bank’s
18
intertemporal budget constraint.
Finally, the central bank is forbidden to finance the government debt by law. Namely,
the central bank cannot purchase any government bonds.
The central bank’s flow budget constraint is described as follows:
r∗tB
∗
t +Bt+1 + Tt︸ ︷︷ ︸
resources
= rtBt +B
∗
t+1 +
Φ
2
(
B∗t+1 −B
∗
t
)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
expenses
(16)
, where Tt = τK,tKt + τN,t
The central bank receives tax revenue Tt from entrepreneurs as well as returns on
foreign reserve holdings r∗tB
∗
t from abroad and domestic liquid bond proceeds Bt+1. On
the side of expenses, the central bank needs to pay back the liquid bond issued a period
ahead rtBt and to decide the amount of foreign reserves to purchase B
∗
t+1. Notice that
accumulating foreign reserves is not costless. A quadratic adjustment cost
(
B∗t+1 − B
∗
t
)2
is introduced to take into account the costs of foreign reserve holding and to preven-
t explosive solution in small open economy model (following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2003)). We further assume that the central bank does not consume.
Interaction between the private sector and the central bank
What is the role played by the central bank in our model economy. We present below
the balance sheets of the central bank and of the private sector for illustration.
In fact, by providing a liquid central bank bond, the saving entrepreneur can save up
to first-best level with this supplementary saving instrument. Therefore the retained earn-
ings of this entrepreneur in the investing period will increase, allowing the entrepreneur
to invest more in capital stock.
The central bank’s choice of purchasing foreign reserve assets
The use of public debt, e.g. government or central bank bonds, has proved to be
a welfare-improving strategy to raise domestic capital formation, as Woodford (1990)
demonstrates. In this paper, I further argue that in order to provide this liquid bond,
19
central bank bondForeign reserves
Assets Liabilities
(B)(B∗)
Own capital
Assets Liabilities
(Savings S)
central bank bond
(B)
Loans
(L)
Retained earnings
Assets Liabilities
(r × S)
Capital stock
(K)
Loans
(L)
Saving entrepreneur
Investing entrepreneur
central bank
Figure 8: Balance sheet of the central bank and the private sector
the central bank needs to invest the bond proceeds abroad. There are not available
alternatives. As a result, massive foreign reserve accumulation is a natural consequence
of a growth strategy aiming at promoting domestic capital formation.
Based on the experience of China, several arguments can be advanced to explain why
the central bank has to invest bond proceeds in foreign assets. First, the domestic financial
market is very shallow in scope; as a result the domestic investment opportunities are
limited. According to Walter and Howie (2012), in China ‘the banks are the financial
system’ and ‘it is bank lending and [public] bond issuance that keep the engine of Chinas
state-owned economy revving at high speed.’ Besides the bank deposits and loans (which
are integrated into the private sector in our model), the private bond market and equity
markets are very small. For example, in 2007 which was a record year for Chinese equity
financing, more than 123 billion of U.S. dollar was raised on the equity market, but in the
same year, banks extended new loans totaling 530 billion of dollars and total debt issues
in the bond market accounted for another 355 billion. Now, if we look at more carefully at
the Chinese bond market, we observe that this market is dominated by public obligations,
i.e. government debt, central bank bond and policy bank bond issuance. Corporate and
commercial papers are very recent financial products and their weight on domestic bond
market is negligible (around 5%) compared to the public issuance (Figure 9).
Moreover, the central bank cannot directly buy government debt. This is prohibited
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Figure 9: Public bonds vs. private bonds
by the Law of the People’s Bank of China of 1995 and its amendment in 2003. The
proportion of the central bank bonds has steadily increased from 2002 to 2010, a period
when Chinese foreign reserves have rapidly increased and the government’s capacity of
issuing new debts was limited.
Figure 10: Decomposition of the Chinese bond market
Finally, the domestic financial system is mainly state-owned. If the central bank
invested bond proceeds domestically, the money would just be going around in circles.
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The central bank’s policy
In order to promote domestic economic growth, the central bank has mainly three
instruments: domestic interest rate, liquid bond issuance and foreign reserve purchasing,
as indicated in the table below.
Table 1: Different variables
Central Bank policy Market variables Exogenous fiscal policy
rt+1 c
S
t , c
I
t τK,t, τN,t
Bt Kt+1
B∗t St+1, Lt+1
The usefulness of the instruments depends on the policy regime that a country has.
We will below compare several policy regimes in order to see whether accumulating foreign
reserves consists of an optimal policy for the central bank. Different policy regimes are
defined as follows, according to Bacchetta et al. (2012).
Table 2: Policy regimes
Policy Instruments
Policy regime Characteristics Foreign Reserves Interest Rate
Financial autarky Only fiscal policy & public
debt
B∗ = 0 r ∈ ℜ+
Open Economy Saving opportunity abroad B∗ ∈ ℜ+ r = r∗
Semi-open economy Controls on private flows B∗ ∈ ℜ+ r ∈ ℜ+
Notice that in this model, the financial intermediary is absent in this model. However,
the results that I derive in the subsequent sections will not change if a perfectly competi-
tive banking sector is introduced. Therefore, to keep the model tractable, I decide to put
the financial sector aside in this paper.
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2.4 Market clearing
On the financial market
The amount of the liquid bonds that the central bank provides is equal to the difference
between the savings of the saving entrepreneur and the loans asked by the investing
entrepreneur at each period, namely,
Bt︸︷︷︸
supply of liquid bonds
= St − Lt︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand for liquid bonds
(17)
A positive Bt is motivated by the fact that the investing entrepreneur is financially
constrained. Otherwise, the borrowing need Lt oughts to absorb all the savings St on the
financial market, leading to Bt = 0.
On the good market
Output produced by the saving entrepreneur is consumed by both entrepreneurs and
the labor force, to invest in capital investment or to buy foreign reserves. We thus have
the following aggregate clearing condition:
F (At, Kt) = c
S
t + c
I
t +wt+Kt+1− (r
∗
t −1)B
∗
t + B
∗
t+1 − B
∗
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
current account balance
+
Φ
2
(
B∗t+1 − B
∗
t
)2
(18)
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3 Market equilibrium without public intervention
In this section, I present some fundamental characteristics of the model which can
be analytically derived in a decentralized market equilibrium. I can show the saving
entrepreneur tends to make precautionary savings, knowing that he will be constrained
for borrowing next period in his investment stage. Moreover, I demonstrate that when the
financial constraint is strong enough (ψ < 1
2
), in steady state, the constraint is binding
and the constrained steady state is uniquely determined. Finally, I will show how the
central bank policy can ameliorate the capital formation in the model economy. In
order to derive analytical results, I use log-utility and Cobb-Douglas production function
henceforth, namely U(cit) = log(c
i
t), i ∈ (S, I) and F (Kt, At) = K
α
t A
1−α
t .
Definition 1 A perfect foresight market equilibrium in a decentralized economy is a se-
quence of prices {wt, rt} and an allocation {c
S
t , c
I
t , Kt+1, St+1, Lt+1}, for a given policy
set {B∗t , Bt, τK,t, τN,t} (t = 0, 1, 2, ...), and for given initial conditions{K0, L0, S0, B0, B
∗
0},
such that for all t ≥ 0:
1. Given prices and the government policy, {cSt , c
I
t , Kt+1, St+1, Lt+1} satisfy the first
order conditions (10) to (13)
2. Government budget constraint is verified (16)
3. Financial and good markets are cleared: (17) and (18)
Notice that depending on the economic policy regime, the central bank can use all or
part of its policy instruments {rt, B
∗
t , Bt}.
With the log-utility and equations (1), (2),(12), (13), we can show that the optimal
consumption derived from each entrepreneur’s utility maximization program represents
a constant share of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth at the beginning of the period (See
Appendix A).
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cSt = (1− β)(Πt − rtLt) (19)
cIt = (1− β)rtSt (20)
Then, we obtain:
St+1 = β(Πt − rtLt) (21)
Kt+2 − Lt+2 = βrt+1St+1 (22)
3.1 Entrepreneurs’ precautionary savings
We can first show a common result as the literature of domestic financial under-
development is used to present: due to the credit constraint entrepreneurs save more
than in a perfect market without credit frictions. This extra savings correspond to the
‘precautionary savings’ of the saving entrepreneur who anticipates the credit constraint
that he will face a period later when there will be a productive investment plan.
Indeed, when the credit constraint is binding, the savings made by the saving en-
trepreneur is determined using (1), (2) and the optimal intertemporal allocation from the
saving stage to the investing stage 12:
St+1 =
1
1 + β

β(1− ψ)F˜K,tKt︸ ︷︷ ︸
predetermined
+
Kt+2
rt+1
−
Lt+2
rt+1

 (23)
As the credit constraint is binding, Lt+2 ≤ L
∗
t+2, L
∗
t+2 being the level of borrowing
when the credit constraint is absent. Therefore, St+1 ≥ S
∗
t+1, S
∗
t+1 being the private
savings in the absence of any credit constraint. The saving entrepreneur saves thus more
compared to the first-best situation where the financial market is frictionless.
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3.2 Capital formation
How does the capital stock evolve over time? From (22), the capital accumulation
consistent with optimal consumptions satisfies:
Kt+2 = βrt+1St+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
retained earnings
+Lt+2︸︷︷︸
loans
(24)
= β2rt+1(1− ψ)F˜K,tKt +
ψF˜K,t+2Kt+2
rt+2
(25)
Notice that the retained earnings and the loans are reversely affected by interest
rates. An increase in domestic interest rate raises the retained earnings of the saving
entrepreneur (revenue effect) but reduces the loans that the investing entrepreneur may
make (price effect). Therefore, for any entrepreneur, the stock of capital is affected by
two-period interest rates. Whether the capital stock increases or decreases depends on
which effect dominates.
We also observe a financial accelerator effect in equation (25). An initial positive
shock on the retained earnings (either an increase in rt+1 or an increase in initial capital
stock F˜K,tKt) will lead to an increase in capital formation at tt+2, which in turn drives
up loans. As a result, contemporary capital formation further increases, generating a
virtuous cycle.
From (25), one can easily show that ceteris paribus
∂Kt+2
∂rt+1
> 0
∂Kt+2
∂rt+2
< 0
3.3 Steady state
I now study the steady state of the decentralized economy. I normalize all policy
variables by the disposable income Π = F˜KK. Namely we define b
∗ = B
∗
Π
, b = B
Π
and
τ˜ = T
Π
.
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From the central bank’s budget constraint (16), we know that
(r∗ − 1)b∗ + τ˜ = (r − 1)b (26)
Given international and domestic interest rates, we observe from the equation above
that if the central bank wants to provide liquid assets in the domestic economy, it can
achieve this objective either by raising distortionary taxes or by purchasing foreign re-
serves. The foreign reserve purchasing allows the central bank to provide liquid assets
without distorting the economy.
Uniqueness of the binding steady state
Now, we show that the steady state is uniquely determined.
From (12) and (13), we know that in steady state
• the credit constraint is binding when r < 1
β
(
(βr)2 = 1
1+λ
< 1
)
• the credit constraint is unbinding when r = 1
β
Proposition 1 The financially constrained steady state is uniquely determined if 0 ≤
b < β(1− 2ψ).
Proof. See Appendix B
From Proposition 1, we can conclude that the credit constraint is not binding when
b ≥ β(1 − 2ψ); the central bank can achieve this goal by raising b∗ or τ˜ . The credit
constraint is binding when 0 < b < β(1 − 2ψ). We also observe that with the credit
constraint, the domestic interest rate is repressed and lower than the world interest rate
1
β
. When the central bank provides liquid bonds which were scarce in the economy, it
lowers the price of the liquid bonds and pushes the domestic interest rate up to the world
interest rate level. r is indeed increasing in b: r = ψ
β(1−ψ)−b
We can further prove that the coefficient of the tightness of the credit constraint is
important for whether the credit constraint is binding in the steady state. When ψ ≥ 1
2
,
the credit constraint is unbinding in the steady state. When ψ < 1
2
, the credit constraint
is strictly binding in the steady state (See Appendix C for detail).
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We can further look at the different steady states in different policy regimes described
in Table 2.
Financial autarky In a closed economy where B∗ = 0, if ψ ≥ 1/2, the credit constraint
does not bind in the steady state. In this case, βr = 1, namely, the domestic interest rate
is equal to the world interest rate (assuming the same time preference). K = A(αβ)
1
1−α ,
capital stock achieves its first-best level, assuming that there is no distortionary tax
τK = 0. And the consumptions are perfectly smoothed, namely the consumptions in the
saving stage and the investing stage are equalized cI = cS.
If ψ < 1/2, the credit constraint binds in the steady state. The Lagrange multiplier
associated with the credit constraint is thus positive, λ = 1
β2r2
− 1 > 0. We have the
domestic interest rate less than the world interest rate, namely βr = ψ
1−ψ
< 1. Capital
stock cannot achieve the first-best level, K = A
[
α
(
(1 − ψ)β2r + ψ
r
)] 11−α
. As for the
consumptions, that of the investing stage is always smaller than that of the saving stage,
cI
cS
= ψ
1−ψ
< 1.
In fact, in a financial autarky, with the productivity growth, the more capital the bet-
ter. There is thus a strong demand for liquid assets. However, investors are constrained
and the central bank does not have sufficient resources to provide domestic assets with-
out distorting the domestic economy. Therefore, the economy may be constrained if the
credit constraint is very tight.
Open economy One big difference compared to the financial autarky is that the domes-
tic interest rate is always equal to the world interest rate in the steady state, r = r∗ = 1
β
.
In this case the credit constraint in never binding, leading to b = b∗ = β(1 − 2ψ), in
the absence of distortionary taxes. In an open economy, both the central bank and th
saving entrepreneur have access to international financial market, therefore, the saving
entrepreneur can make deposits abroad. In aggregate, there are sufficient foreign assets
to increase saving revenues of domestic entrepreneurs. Therefore, in steady state, the
economy is unconstrained.
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Table 3: Decentralized economy
Economic Structure Steady State ψ
Financial autarky constrained ψ < 1
2
unconstrained ψ ≥ 1
2
Open Economy unconstrained ∀ψ
The capital formation in the steady state
In the steady state, how the capital stock evolves over time with policy variables?
Previously we demonstrate that the capital stock is composed of retained earnings and
borrowing and that retained earnings are increasing in the interest rate while borrowing
is decreasing in the interest rate. The capital stock thus depends on both the revenue
effect and of the price effect of interest rates.
Proposition 2 The capital stock represents a U-shape curve as a function of βr. Pur-
chasing foreign reserves, which leads to a higher supply of domestic liquid assets and thus
a higher interest rate, helps increase the capital stock and raise the production in the
economy.
Proof. See Appendix D
For simplicity, we ignore distortionary taxes which will only shift the U-shape curve
in Figure 11 vertically but do not change the shape of the curve.
From Figure 11, we observe that the capital stock achieves its first-best level if βr = 1
(i.e. when the credit constraint is not binding) or if βr = ψ
1−ψ
. In the first case where
βr = 1, the economy is in the steady state with an unconstrained credit constraint (i.e.
either in a full open economy or in a financial autarky with ψ ≥ 1
2
). In the second case
where βr = ψ
1−ψ
, the economy is in a financially autarkic steady state where the central
bank does not provide any liquidy saving instruments.
When ψ
1−ψ
≤ βr ≤
√
ψ
1−ψ
, the curve is decreasing. when the central bank starts
to provide liquid bonds, this raises the interest rate, leading to a more stringent credit
constraint and thus a lower level of borrowing. At the same time, as the financial market
is under-developed, the saving entrepreneur cannot save as much as he wants short of
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βr
(
K
A
)1−α
1ψ1−ψ
√
ψ
1−ψ
αβ
Unconstrained Steady StateConstrained Steady State w/o Liquid Bonds
Figure 11: U-shape capital stock
sufficient saving instruments on the market. Therefore, on this part of the curve, the
price effect of the interest rate dominates the revenue effect, leading to a decrease in the
capital stock.
When
√
ψ
1−ψ
≤ βr ≤ 1, the curve is increasing. This is because when the central bank
provides more and more liquid assets, the price of these assets further decrease and raise
even more the interest rate, any entrepreneur in his saving stage can save up to the first-
best level and the retained earnings increase with the interest rate. Bear in mind that the
retained earnings are used for capital investment a period later when the entrepreneur
faces investment opportunities. The revenue effect dominates the price effect on this part
of the curve.
We can gain a more precise insight of how capital formation evolves with the interest
rate by examining the following equation (derived in Appendix D):
F˜K =
r
(βr)2 + ψ[1− (βr)2]
(27)
We identify three effects which affect the capital stock in the economy:
• Opportunity cost of capital, r
• Revenue effect, (βr)2 = 1
1+λ
• Wealth effect, ψ[1− (βr)2]
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The first effect, opportunity cost of capital, is standard: the higher is r, the higher
is the cost of investing in capital stock compare to buying bonds, the less capital is
demanded. The other two effects are particular in our model.
The second term (βr)2 is related to the credit constraint in the economy. As en-
trepreneurs are occasionally credit-constrained, they have incentives to partly rely on
retained earnings (precautionary savings) in order to be able to invest in capital even
they are constrained. As the retained earnings are increasing in interest rate, this ef-
fect has a positive impact on capital stock (i.e. revenue effect). Notice that the square
appears as the capital is invested every two periods. In an extreme case, when ψ = 0
(the constraint extremely binding), the second effect clearly dominates the first one. As
a result, a higher supply of the liquid bonds leads to a higher domestic interest rate,
unambiguously increasing the capital stock.
The third effect stems from the fact that the loans that an investing entrepreneur can
make is conditional on the discounted valued of the future production. An increase in r
decreases the borrowing capacity of investing entrepreneurs, as it lowers the discounted
value of the collateral. The interest rate has thus a negative price effect on capital
stock. As described above, the price effect dominates the revenue effect when the supply
of liquidity is very low, as in this case the collateral value of capital becomes so large
that it dominates the other effects. However, the capital formation has a feedback loop
effect on the credit constraint. Namely, more capital invested provides stronger collateral
in the next period, allowing investing entrepreneurs to borrow more money during the
investing stage and leading to a looser credit constraint. As the credit constraint becomes
less stringent, this third effect becomes less important and is dominated by the revenue
effect. The tightness of the credit constraint can also dampen the collateral effect on
capital, making the revenue effect stronger than the price effect.
As long as the central bank provides liquid bonds B by purchasing foreign reserves
B∗, it can push up domestic interest rate to the world interest rate and to push domestic
capital formation to its first-best level.
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4 The central bank’s optimal policy
Until now we have analyzed the fundamental characteristics of our model and its
steady states, both when the credit constraint is binding or unbinding. We have also
examined two policy regimes - financial autarky and open economy. In the first case,
the central bank, along with a latent government setting tax rates, uses public bond and
interest rate to adjust the economy. In the second case, when the economy is fully open,
the private sector has a direct access to international financial market to eliminate the
domestic credit constraint. As a result, the central bank is somewhat bypassed by the
private sector.
Now we examine the central bank’s policy in a semi-open economy, namely when the
central bank is the only one which can borrow or lend abroad. In such a policy setting,
can the public intervention of the central bank improve the welfare of the economy? We
use here the Ramsey problem presented in Chapter 15 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
4.1 General setting
We assume that the central bank optimizes the consumptions of contemporaneous en-
trepreneurs in their different stages as well as the labor income, according to the following
objective function. Remember that in a semi-open economy, the central bank can decide
both the amount of foreign assets to purchase, B∗t+1, and the domestic interest rate rt+1.
max
{St+1,Lt+1,B∗t+1,Kt+1,c
S
t ,c
I
t ,wt,rt+1,λt+1}
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(cSt ) + u(c
I
t ) + ωu(wt)
}
(28)
Definition 2 (Ramsey problem) The central bank’s optimal policy consists of choos-
ing a sequence of policy variables {B∗t+1, Bt+1, rt+1}
∞
0 such that:
• The corresponding competitive equilibrium allocation (10) to (13) maximizes the
welfare function (28)
• Individual entrepreneurs’ budget constraints, (1) and (2), are verified
• Government budget constraint (16) and resource constraint (18) are verified
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• Bond market (17) is cleared
The way to solve the Ramsey problem follows the “Primal Approach” described by
Erosa and Gervais (2001).
The full Ramsey problem is presented below. Equation (11) is used to substitute F˜N,t
by wt.
max
{St+1,Lt+1,B∗t+1,Kt+1,c
S
t ,c
I
t ,wt,rt+1,λt+1}
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(cSt ) + u(c
I
t ) + ωu(wt)
+ηSt
[
F˜K,tKt − rtLt − c
S
t − St+1
]
+ηIt
[
rtSt + Lt+1 − c
I
t −Kt+1
]
+ηGt
[
FK,tKt + FN,t − c
S
t − c
I
t − wt −Kt+1 − B
∗
t+1 + r
∗
tB
∗
t −
Φ
2
(
B∗t+1 − B
∗
t
)2]
+θSt
[
1
cSt
− βrt+1
1
cIt+1
]
+θIt
[
1
cIt
− βrt+1(1 + λt+1)
1
cSt+1
]
+ρt
[
(1 + ψλt)F˜K,t − rt(1 + λt)
]
+Λt
[
ψF˜K,tKt − rtLt
]}
We then need to derive first order conditions with respect to all endogenous variables.
33
FOC(St+1) : η
S
t = βrt+1η
I
t+1 (29)
FOC(Lt+1) : η
I
t = βrt+1
(
ηSt+1 + Λt+1
)
(30)
FOC(B∗t+1) : η
G
t
[
1 + Φ(B∗t+1 − B
∗
t )
]
= βr∗t+1η
G
t+1
[
1 +
Φ(B∗t+2 − B
∗
t+1)
r∗t+1
]
(31)
FOC(Kt+1) : βη
S
t+1F˜K,t+1 − η
I
t − η
G
t + βη
G
t+1FK,t+1 + βψΛt+1F˜K,t+1 = 0 (32)
FOC(cSt ) :
1
cSt
− ηSt − η
G
t −
θSt
(cSt )
2
+
θIt−1rt(1 + λt)
(cSt )
2
= 0 (33)
FOC(cIt ) :
1
cIt
− ηIt − η
G
t −
θIt
(cIt )
2
+
θSt−1rt
(cIt )
2
= 0 (34)
FOC(rt+1) : βη
I
t+1St+1 − β
(
ηSt+1 + Λt+1
)
Lt+1 − β
θSt
cIt+1
− βθIt
(1 + λt+1)
cSt+1
− βρt+1 (1 + λt+1) = 0
(35)
FOC(λt+1) :
−θIt βrt+1
cSt+1
+ βρt+1
(
ψF˜k,t+1 − rt+1
)
= 0 (36)
We can also derive the first order conditions with respect to F˜K,t+1 or/and F˜N,t+1 (wt),
if we allow the central bank to set tax rates as well.
FOC(F˜K,t) : η
S
t+1Kt+1 + ρt+1ψλt+1 + Λt+1ψKt+1 (37)
FOC(wt) :
ω
wt
− ηGt = 0 (38)
4.2 Steady state
When the central bank actively uses its policy instruments {Bt+1, B
∗
t+1, rr+1} to adjust
the economy, what is the steady state it can achieve?
Financial autarky
In the financial autarky, the first order condition (31) is no longer relevant, B∗ = 0.
Whether the steady state is financially constrained depends thus on, as in the decentral-
ized economy, the tightness of the credit constraint.
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Proposition 3 The central bank can achieve the steady state with an unconstrained credit
constraint when the coefficient of the tightness of the credit constraint ψ ≥ 1
2
. That is,
λ = Λ = 0, βr = 1 and cS = cI . When ψ < 1
2
, the steady state with the Ramsey policy is
constrained. That is, λ > 0, Λ > 0, βr < 1 and cI < cS.
Open economy
Proposition 4 The central bank can achieve the steady state with an unconstrained credit
constraint in an open economy by using an optimal policy a` la Ramsey. That is, the
central bank can achieve the same steady state as the decentralized economy does in an
open economy.
Proof. See Appendix E
4.3 Economic transition in a semi-open economy
We have seen so far that the steady state does not change in the Ramsey program
compare to the decentralized economy, both in a financial autarkic setting or in an open
economy. How about the economic transition in a semi-open economy towards a steady
state where the economy will be fully open? In a semi-open economy, the central bank
has two instruments in its hands: central bank bond and interest rate. Therefore, we
argue that the Ramsey program in a semi-open economy is welfare improving compare
to a financial autarky or an open economy.
Indeed, the foreign reserve accumulation is a second-best strategy of economic growth,
taking into account both credit constraint and capital controls. A combined use of capital
controls and foreign reserve holding allows the central bank to have sufficient funding to
provide liquid assets within the country and at the same time to be able to adjust domestic
interest rate whenever it is necessary.
To see this, we should pay attention to the first order condition (35).
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FOC(rt+1) : η
I
t+1St+1 −
(
ηSt+1 + Λt+1
)
Lt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
redistributive effects
−
θSt
cIt+1
−
θIt (1 + λt+1)
cSt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemporal choices
− ρt+1 (1 + λt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity cost
= 0
When the capital account is closed and the central bank accumulates foreign reserves,
it can control domestic interest rates subject to different policy objectives. When the
central bank increases domestic interest rate, this is beneficial for the investor of the
next period as the revenue from savings will be higher (first term). However, this will
be harmful for the saver of the next period as it has to pay higher interests of loans
they made during the investment stage (second term). It will also change intertemporal
behavior of entrepreneurs, leading to more savings and less consumption, thus decreasing
social welfare (third and fourth terms). Finally, a higher domestic interest rate implies
higher opportunity cost, therefore the capital investment will decrease (the last term).
The first two terms translate a redistributive trade-off that the central bank has to face.
This redistributive effects also imply welfare costs to the economy. Indeed, if the current
investors are very constrained and the central bank thinks the long run steady state can
be achieved soon, it has incentives to decrease the interest rate to alleviate the interest
burden of investing firms. If on the contrary the central bank believes that the economy
will still be constrained for a long period, it has incentives to rise domestic interest rate,
so that the current savers may transfer a larger amount of interest revenue to the future
when they will be constrained.
Depending on the tightness of the credit constraint and the speed of convergence to
the steady state, the central bank can decide to favor savers or investors in order to
enhance the social welfare.
Denote Ht the left hand side of the equation (35). We can show that
Ht =
(
∞∑
i=1
Λt+2i
)
St+1 −
(
∞∑
i=1
Λt+2i+1
)
Lt+1 (39)
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In sum, when Ht is different from 0, the central bank has incentives to intervene and
the open economy does not provide an optimal equilibrium. If Ht > 0, the central bank
has incentives to raise interest rate to favor savers. If Ht < 0, the central bank has
incentives to lower interest rate. In general, as Table 4 shows, with financial frictions
an open economy is suboptimal during transition while an economy with closed capital
account and sufficient foreign reserves can achieve higher social welfare during transition.
Table 4: Static vs. Dynamic approach
Central Bank Intervention
Economic Structure Steady state Dynamics
Financial autarky depending on ψ suboptimal
Open Economy unconstrained suboptimal
Semi-open unconstrained optimal
We illustrate this the optimality of the central bank’s policy with a numerical study.
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5 Numerical study
5.1 Calibration
We simulate our model in a semi-open economy using Dynare 4.3.2 (see
Adjemian et al. (2011)). The shock comes from an unanticipated productivity growth
which is exogenous to the model. From this exercise, we will see how during a fast grow-
ing economic transition, the foreign reserve accumulation, combined with a closed capital
account, helps the model economy to achieve the first-best level of capital stock.
The shock on At follows the process below:
At = (1 + gt)At−1 (40)
gt = σgt−1 + ǫt (41)
The accelerator of the growth rate, σt, is less than 1, ensuring the growth rate con-
verges to 0. The growth rate gt can be disturbed by an exogenous shock denoted ǫt. We
assume that ǫt is a white noise and we denote g0 the initial technology growth rate.
I calibrate the model based on the recent literature on economic growth and foreign
reserve accumulation in an economy with financial constraints. Song et al. (2011) is an
important reference as it is the most recent theoretical paper on the strategy of economic
growth in China in the presence of financial constraint. However, I need to point out
that I do not pretend to quantitatively explain the foreign reserve accumulation in China
since the early 2000s due to the simplicity of the model. I aim at illustrating with my
numerical results a qualitative analysis of the foreign reserve policy in an economy with
both financial and capital account frictions.
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Table 5: Calibration
Symbol Meaning Value Remarks
α share of capital in the production 0.33
β discount fact 0.95
ψ credit constraint tightness 0.1 keeping the constraint binding
g0 initial growth rate 0.10 targeting an annual growth rate
of 10%
σ technology growth rate autocor-
relation coefficient
0.6 generating a lasting growth path
ω share of the labor income in the
Ramsey objective function
1
φ adjustment cost of purchasing re-
serves
0.01
5.2 The demand for foreign assets as a response to the credit
constraint
First of all, my model can replicate the results that the existing literature has illustrat-
ed about the foreign reserve accumulation in the presence of domestic credit constraints
(in a fully open economy): the more stringent is the credit constraint, the higher domestic
savings are, leading to a current account surplus and foreign reserve stockpiling.
The blue line in Figure 12 and 13 represents the situation where ψ = 0.05 (tight credit
constraint) while the black line represents the opposite situation where ψ = 0.45 (loose
credit constraint). Notice that a tighter credit constraint encourages entrepreneurs to
save more, for that the central bank has to provide a larger level of domestic liquid bond.
Due to the constrained domestic financial market, the provision of central bank bonds
requires more investment in foreign reserves. It is interesting to see that in case where
the credit constraint hardly binds (the black line), the demand for domestic central bank
bond and for foreign assets is very low.
In terms of welfare, we observe that entrepreneurs are better off regardless to their
stage, as the supply of central bank bond increases entrepreneurs’ retained earnings and
lowers their debt burden. As for capital accumulation, there is a gap, during transi-
tion only, between the levels of capital stock when the credit constraint is very binding
(blue line) and when the constraint does not bind strongly (black line). Namely, a less
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constrained domestic financial market allows the capital accumulation to achieve the
unbinding steady state slightly faster than when the constraint is more binding.
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Figure 12: Responses to the credit constraint tightness in open economy - 1
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Figure 13: Responses to the credit constraint tightness in open economy - 2
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5.3 Economic transition in a semi-open economy
We can see from Figure 14 that the central bank’s optimal policy in an economy with
capital controls allows a fast transition than in an open economy. By accumulating more
foreign reserves during transition (B∗), the central bank is able to issue more domestic
liquid assets (B) and with capital controls it raises domestic interest rate (r). This leads
to higher domestic corporate savings (S) and thus higher capital investment (K). The
revenue effect of the interest rate overrides the price effect as we observe that the loans
asked by the investing entrepreneur decreases as the domestic interest rate increases.
Domestic consumption levels are also higher for both types of entrepreneurs. Notice
that the accumulation of foreign reserves will stabilize when the financial deepening (the
capital-to-output ratio) is sufficiently large.
If we look at Chinese data, we can observe that along with massive foreign reserve
accumulation in China the supply of the central bank’s assets (e.g. central bank bonds
or required reserves) has increased massively (see Figure 4). The surge in the central
bank’s assets has absorbed the liquidity in private sector and has forced entrepreneurs to
save instead of consuming more. In this way, capital is channeled to productive plans,
boosting an investment-driven growth.
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6 Conclusion
Based on the model presented in this paper, we can partly attribute the rapid ac-
cumulation of foreign exchange reserves in China and in some other emerging market
economies to the under-development of the financial market there. During the economic
transition, these countries may have a strong demand for liquid assets to support domes-
tic capital accumulation. However, in the absence of a sound financial market, the central
banks in emerging market economies have to serve as a financial intermediary to provide
domestic liquid assets and thus alleviate the financial constraint facing some domestic
firms. The bond proceeds of the public bond issuance are invested abroad in the form of
foreign exchange reserves short of domestic investment opportunities.
This paper also advocates the (temporary) use of capital controls (especially in terms
of controls on inflows). It is proved that foreign reserve accumulation is a second-best
growth strategy only if public and private capital flows are imperfectly substitutable. A
combined use of capital controls and foreign reserve accumulation allows the central bank
to insure that firms save enough to invest in fixed capital, leading to a higher level of
domestic production.
The demand for foreign assets will at last diminish when the economy approaches its
steady state and the growth rate slows down. Moreover, a further development of do-
mestic financial market, especially in terms of multiplication of domestic assets available
for investment, will help mitigate the demand for foreign assets.
We need to also notice that this paper only considers the domestic welfare effects
associated with foreign reserve accumulation. The spill-over effects of such a policy are
left unexamined. Moreover, this model is based on the assumption of the neoclassical
growth model: the growth rate stems from a high capital investment. In the aftermath
of the global financial crises, many countries started to rethink of their growth model.
In this context, if accumulating foreign reserves and controlling capital flows might be
useful during economic transition, they should not hinder any structural reforms aiming at
developing domestic financial market and strengthening domestic consumption. Indeed,
as this paper shows, an open economy can always achieve the unconstrained steady state
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without distorting the economy. A sound domestic financial market will contribute to a
more sustainable economic growth in emerging market economies.
In the case of China, we observe some noticeable reforms to modernize domestic finan-
cial market since the mid-2000s. The call for the development of bond markets in China
started only in 2005 with the support of the Chinese Communist party’s ‘Nine Articles
(Walter and Howie (2012)).’ On the same year, short-term corporate debt was allowed
to be issued. There was an immediate issuing of RMB 142 billion (US$17 billion). This
amount tripled in 2008. At the same time, a financial industry association - the National
Association of Financial markets Institutional Investors (NAFMII) - was established to
manage corporate bond issuance. We need to wait until April 2008 for the issuance of a
thee- to five-year medium term note to be permitted. In spite of these recent reforms, the
share of private financial instruments is still very small compared to the that of public
debt. There is still a long way to go for China to fully develop its domestic financial
market. We may expect that Chinese foreign reserves will still increase, maybe this time
with a slower pace.
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A Proof
Proof. It is easy to derive from the inter-temporal budget constraints of the saving
entrepreneur and of the investing entrepreneur that:
cSt =(1− β)
[ ∞∑
j=0
F˜K,t+2jKt+2j
2j∏
i=1
(
1
rt+i
)
−
∞∑
j=0
Kt+2j+2
2j+1∏
i=1
(
1
rt+i
)
− rtLt
]
(42)
cIt =(1− β)
[ ∞∑
j=0
F˜K,t+2j+1Kt+2j+1
2j+1∏
i=1
(
1
rt+i
)
−
∞∑
j=0
Kt+2j+1
2j∏
i=1
(
1
rt+i
)
+ rtSt
]
(43)
In a two-period economy, only the saving entrepreneur harvest an output. Therefore,
cSt = (1− β)(Πt − rtLt)
cIt = (1− β)rtSt
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In a decentralized economy, the central bank bonds and tax rates are considered
as exogenous. We know that the central bank has to have a balanced budget (16) and the
financial market has to be cleared (17). The steady state of the model when the credit
constraint is binding is determined by the following conditions:
• Central Bank’s budget balance
• Financial market clearing
Using (17), (21) and the binding credit constraint:
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B = S − L (44)
⇒ B = β(Π− rL)− L (45)
⇒ B = β(1− ψ)Π−
ψΠ
r
(46)
⇒ b = β(1− ψ)−
ψ
r
(47)
The financial market clearing shows a negative linear relationship between b and 1
r
.
Moreover, using (26),
(r − 1)b = (r∗ − 1)b∗ + τ˜ (48)
⇒ b =
1
r − 1
[(r∗ − 1)b∗ + τ˜ ] (49)
⇒ b =
(
1
1− 1
r
− 1
)
v(r∗, b, τ˜ ) (50)
The balanced central bank’s budget shows a non-linear relationship between b and 1
r
.
Therefore, we can graphically demonstrate the uniqueness of the steady state when
the credit constraint is binding.
Figure 15 shows that the there may be two solutions of 1
r
, corresponding respectively
to b ≥ 0 (the smaller root) and b ≤ 0 (the bigger root). We focus here on the first
case, a positive supply of central bank bonds and the gross interest rate bigger than
1. This equilibrium corresponds to b ≥ 0. The interest rate is uniquely determined,
β < 1
r
< min(1, β(1−ψ)
ψ
). For small value of ψ, for example ψ ≤ 1
2
, 1
β
ψ
1−ψ
< r < 1
β
.
Therefore, when 0 < b < β(1− 2ψ), the economy has a unique binding steady state,
provided that ψ ≤ 0.5.
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Figure 15: Uniqueness of binding steady state
C Proof
Proof. In a steady state when the credit constraint is not binding, we know that S = L
and βr = 1.
From (21) and (22), we have:
S = β(F˜K − rL)
⇒S = L =
1
2
βF˜KK
When the credit constraint is not binding, we know that rL ≤ ψF˜KK, namely
1
2
F˜KK ≤ ψF˜KK.
Therefore, in a steady state with an unbinding credit constraint, we have:
ψ ≥
1
2
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D Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Assume we are in a constrained state steady. Then from (12) and (13), we can
derive:
1 + λ =
1
β2r2
(51)
Using this result, along with the first order condition of capital (10), we obtain equa-
tion (27).
F˜K =
r
(βr)2 + ψ[1− (βr)2]
Namely,
(
K
A
)1−α
= αβ
1
βτK +
1
βr(1−ψ)+ ψ
βr
(52)
In absence of tax (subsidy) on capital, the equation (52) becomes:
(
K
A
)1−α
= αβ
(
βr(1− ψ) +
ψ
βr
)
(53)
Graphically, from its first-best level, K firstly decreases in βr then increases to go
back to the first best.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In the open economy steady state, from (31), we have r∗ = 1
β
, leading to r =
r∗ = 1
β
, namely βr = βr∗ = 1.
Using Ramsey first order conditions (29) and (30), we have ηS = ηI and Λ = 0.
From the definition of the Ramsey problem, we know that the private first order
conditions (10) to (13) are fulfilled, we can derive thus cS = cI and λ = 0.
Substitute these results into (34) and (33), we have θS = θI = 0. Using (35), we have
S = L. There, the steady state is not credit-constrained. All the saving of the saving
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entrepreneur goes to the investing entrepreneur in the form of private loans.
Therefore, in the long run, the economy is not financially constrained in an open
economy with the intervention of the central bank.
From (38), ηg = ω
w
> 0. Given that ηS = ηL ≥ 0, we have
FK = F˜K =
1
β
(54)
Namely, there is no distortionary tax on capital and K = A (αβ)
1
1−α , achieving the
first-best level as described in the decentralized economy with the U-shape curve.
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